On comics, psychosis, and trauma, part 1

How does one write about comics and trauma? For it is by no means an easy subject to understand. Comics is a medium, and trauma is an experience. The trauma that I am most acquainted with is psychosis, and that generally is the experience I draw upon - severe mental illness - when I discuss trauma.
Comics, even if it tackles subjects that resist representation - war, for example, or torture - still rely on certain tenets of representation to make the world of the comic - and by extension the worldhood of the world - intelligible. I'm thinking of frames and gutters, for example. Frames and gutters arguably make a comic a comic - we rely on them for the construction of the comic's world. So we will need to take them into account.
Trauma, in some sense, needs representation, if only because traumatic experiences often burn with the need to be expressed, to be represented, even as the nature of the experience overwhelms a person's capacity for representing it easily. Trauma resists representation, and interpretation, and therefore while it relies on both it also resists both. This is one reason why the representation of trauma is difficult. It is also a commonplace when speaking about trauma.
Interpretation, at least in the way Heidegger understands it, means we take something as something. Interpretation is an angle of vision. I am looking at the blinds of my windows right now, and I know that I see the blinds as blinds. I take them that way. I understand what they are, how they are used, but my understanding is primarily non-conceptual - that is, I look at the blinds as something I cope with, something that is part of my lived world, something that I use to keep the sun out of the room, or adjust to allow the sun to enter the room. I do not theorize about the blinds, I do not stare at them and scrutinize them like a scientific object, I do not come to some dissertation-level conclusion about them before I use them. The blinds, like the world, are there for me to cope with first, and perhaps think about second. The world is pragmatic before it is theoretical.
Psychosis, in a strange way, seems to reverse this equation. How? One has the persistent feeling while psychotic that there is something deeply conceptual about the way one is seeing. Because psychosis is solipsistic, the feeling is of gazing into the recesses of one's own mind. We seem to start with thought, theory, and then secondarily to cope with the practical. This is an essential feature of the psychotic world.
Oftentimes when we do think - when the act of interpretation becomes more explicit, cognitive, and theoretical - it is because something has broken down, something has become conspicuous. I very rarely even notice the blinds, as I do not notice, in some sense, the coffee cup I use in the morning. We all have routines and rituals, and coffee cups are part of those rituals, but when we are actually using the cup to drink coffee, we are not analyzing its constituent properties. We are lifting the cup to drink the coffee. If the blinds break, the coffee cup shatters, then I do become cognizant of them conceptually. But that's a special case.
When our minds break, and we have anosognosia, meaning we are not aware that our minds have broken, what does this mean ontologically, phenomenologically? What kind of psychotic world swims into view? And what does it obscure, what does it elide or obstruct or eclipse?
If one commonplace of the psychotic world is that the theoretical in some sense swamps the practical, another is that the autobiographical, the authentic autobiographical, is also eclipsed. You become a different person, a different self, when you are psychotic. This too is related to the world of psychosis, the psychotic world.
What happens when we throw the representation of trauma into this mix? I do not just mean methods or techniques of representation, such as expressionism, fragmentation of panels, or forms of emptiness and absence related to the gutter, although these are all good and concrete ways to represent trauma in comics. I mean, how does trauma impact interpretation?
If to interpret is to take something as something, then I think the interpretation of trauma - from the standpoint of someone in recovery, for example, and therefore someone for whom trauma is not an academic subject but a living question and existential reality - involves a blurriness, a bewilderment, a confusion, which makes the act of interpretation related to the trauma difficult, and therefore the act of representation. For we do not know what trauma is exactly, and therefore we do not know how to interpret it. In a way, that’s what makes it trauma. Trauma has weird affinities with the sublime defined by Lyotard, which has been pointed out a lot. We can define it, we can name it, we can read a textbook about it, but the experience itself, because it is a shattering experience, eludes our conceptual repertoire, our linguistic repertoire. Every frame has an outside.
Trauma in the form of psychosis is a kind of violence on, and violation of, the commonsensical. That means that, while the act of interpretation involves taking something as something, psychosis changes this dynamic, so that while we are still interpreting, we are interpreting strangely, we are taking something to be what it is not. To take something to be what it is not is in some sense deeply aphilosophical in an interesting way, since one could argue that the essence of Plato's philosophy of the Ideas or Forms is that these things help us to identify what actually is. The Logos, for example, our capacity to use language to reason, to be discursive, to be "concept-mongering," relies on our ability to figure out the determinate world and our way around it, to know what is and what is not, to know generally how things hang together. Madness, on the other hand, takes the unreal, from the first-person perspective, and understands it as the real. This is the basic nature of delusions and hallucinations. So if we associate the quest of philosophy as seeking out forms or shapes of reason and reasoning, or understanding ourselves as discursive creatures, then we have to conclude that madness is the opposite of this.
But psychosis is more that this. Madness, psychosis, is not just the inability to reason. Psychosis is a world. And if we are to come to understand the nature of psychosis as trauma, or the role that psychosis as trauma plays in comics, we need to press on this idea of the psychotic world.
We have so far stated that the psychotic world is a world where theory takes over practice. We've also said that it is difficult to interpret. And finally that psychosis smudges the autobiographical, it blotches it out. For when we are psychotic, and if we also have anosognosia, then we cannot really interpret our psychosis as psychosis. This is arguably what makes madness madness. We cannot see that we are in psychosis, that we have psychosis; we are, instead, telepathic, psychic, some such thing. Something has changed in our autobiographical world. We are, to use a term from Charles Taylor, more porous. There is less distance between us and things, and we cannot take a step back, we have a harder time taking the objective or intersubjective point of view. We are immersed in something, a form of solipsism, and we have less of a buffer between ourselves and the world. When we interpret auditory hallucinations as telepathy, for example, what is happening? In a sense, it seems as though we are operating with a faulty capacity for interpreting. We cannot see what it is; we cannot see the lens our mind is seeing through. So when we are psychotic with anosognosia, it is argued, we are fundamentally interpreting incorrectly. We can't reality-test. We are taking the triangle to be a square; we are understanding red as orange; we are believing that the bear is an invertebrate.
But if psychosis were only a faulty capacity for interpreting, wouldn't it be easy to rectify? We could simply say, "no, Andrew, you are not telepathic, you are hearing voices, auditory halluciations." And be done with it. Yet psychosis is not like that. Why? What is different?
As Louis Sass has argued, psychosis involves an ontological difference. And this is where I think we get to the heart of trauma, and also the heart of the representation of trauma in comics. But how do we get at this ontological difference? For if we could describe it, or convey it, we would have a better understanding of both trauma and psychosis, not to mention the representation of trauma in comics. Normally here I would draw something, using the image itself against the word, in order to convey the overpowering immediacy of psychosis, and also its ontological difference. But I've decided in this context not to draw anything. How do we talk about the ontological difference in words?
Let's use the gutter and frame as analogies. There is something about the frame, the panel, that seems to capture certain characteristics of our visual field, because the frame is perceptually bounded. It has a limit, a boundary, an outside, as does our visual field. We might then come up with an analogy relating frames to persons, saying something like "every person sees the world similarly and differently - we all have a shared "frame of reference," yet we each also see the world through particular frames, individual frames." The frame is the how of how we see the world. And the gutter, we could say, is the implicit way we navigate the world, the unspoken assumptions that guide our social practices.
What does psychosis do to the frame and gutter?
In a way, it rips them out. Why?
The psychotic world is
Theoretical
Not-autobiographical
Solipsistic
Difficult to see or interpret
Start with this assumption: Intersubjectivity is baked into the structure of the world. But if it is such a fundamental structural aspect of our very world, this then suggests how staggeringly traumatic psychosis is, when it rips a person not only from the frame of reference, but from the gutter as well. For a person with psychosis and anosognosia is operating from a different set of assumptions, a different set of social practices. Here, trauma happens because meaning becomes adjacent. What do I mean? Meaning, for Heidegger, as well as later Wittgenstein, is something public, something shared. What makes psychosis something ontologically different is arguably the fact that meaning becomes adjacent as opposed to shared or sharable.
That's a start. But it still feels too abstract to me. Let me try to describe a psychotic experience. I remember I used to think someone who lived in my building was sending energy into me and messing with me. I was convinced that I had to send energy back towards her to fight this malignant influence. One time I went on Twitter, and a video was playing (I don't remember what video), and it seemed as if the video were allowing me access into the mind of this person seemingly playing games with me. As I watched the video, I watched what was happening in her mind. I saw a black wave rise and crash into her mind, and things were shaking.




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